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CASE STUDY 
 
Lean at the C-5 Galaxy Depot: 
Essential Elements of Success 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
Who:  Warner Robins Air Logistics Center (ALC) 
 
Where: Robins Air Force Base, Georgia 
 
When:  Site Visits: January and February 2004 
 
What: Despite the current war, the ALC is subject to 
instability and examining its sources and consequences 
can help us understand future issues and continue the 
improvement and competitiveness of the C-5 program 
which has succeeded in their initial lean efforts.   
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Lean at the C-5 Galaxy Depot: Essential Elements 
of Success 
 
Donning white t-shirts with the slogan “We did it!,” the C-5 mechanics 
and support staff at Warner Robins Air Logistics Center (ALC) in 
Georgia gathered at the flight line last September for a ceremony to 
celebrate the record 23 aircraft delivered in FY03. “I’m proud of you,” 
said General Wetekam, the ALC commander, as the last aircraft to 
complete depot maintenance that fiscal year taxied down the runway.  
 
Examining 
instability, its 
sources, and 
consequences can 
help us understand 
future issues in the 
improvement and 
competitiveness of 
C-5 at Warner 
Robins. 
They had come a long way. Some came, in fact, all the way from San 
Antonio, when the program was transferred in 1998 from Kelly Air 
Force Base, which was closing down under the Base Realignment and 
Closure process (BRAC). Warner Robins won a seven-year contract 
for maintaining the C-5 in a public/private 
competition against three companies, 
including Boeing and Lockheed Martin that 
had pledged to keep the work at Kelly. The 
workforce shrank with the move to Georgia 
from 1,200 to 715 employees; about 1/5 of 
which transferred from San Antonio. For the 
first four years, the program struggled. Then, 
lean repair practices, first introduced in June 
2001, led to remarkable improvements in 
productivity and on-time delivery. Flow days 
have been reduced by one third and all 13 
aircraft deliveries so far in FY04 have been 
ahead of schedule. Furthermore, the C-5 has 
used freed up capacity to bring additional work back to the base from 
private contractors. These achievements have helped secure the recent 
Air Force decision to forgo competition for the upcoming renewal of 
the contract and keep the C-5 work at Warner Robins as an organic, in-
house program.1
 
At a time of war one might expect that workers at an Air Force facility 
would have no fear of losing their jobs.  Yet, we found that workers at 
Warner Robins ALC are subjected to instability--creating pressures 
similar to those felt by workers in the private sector.  These pressures 
include BRAC, with another round of elimination or realignment 
approaching; privatization, which involves competition with private 
companies for workload and contractors working side by side with 
civil service workers; and a new, National Security Personnel System 
(NSPS) that may radically change their rights and work conditions.  
                                                 
1 Other factors may have weighed in this decision. In particular, federal law 
mandates that at least half of Air Force maintenance dollars be spent in-house.    
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This instability can be a motivator, but it can also affect workforce 
morale and cause employees to hold back their knowledge and 
creativity, which are essential for the continued success of lean.2  
Examining instability, its sources, and consequences can help us 
understand future issues in the improvement and competitiveness of C-
5 at Warner Robins. 
 
Background and Methodology 
 
Robins Air Force Base is the largest industrial complex in Georgia, 
employing some 25,000 civilian, contractor and military workers on its 
premises. The Air Logistics Center has over 13,000 employees: about 
2,000 of these are military and 11,000 civil servants. The ALC 
maintains and repairs the C-5 Galaxy, F-15 Eagle, C-130 Hercules and 
C-17 Globemaster, as well as special operations aircraft, avionics and 
electronic warfare. It is also responsible for program management and 
supply chain management for these and other weapon systems. The 
main union at the facility is the American Federation of Government 
Employees (AFGE) Local 987. The local represents some 9,000 
workers at Warner Robins and has 2,600 members. 
 
This case study centers on lean change in the C-5 program. The C-5 
Galaxy is a four engine cargo and troop transport aircraft, the largest 
and one of the oldest in the Air Force inventory.  The aircraft has a 
wingspan of 223 feet, is 247 feet long and 65 feet high.  It has a seven-
person crew and can carry up to 270,000 pounds of cargo.  Today, 
there are 126 C-5s in use: 74 ‘A’ models (built 1969-1986), 50 ‘B’ 
models (1986-1989), and 2 ‘C’ models (a late 1980s modification). 
The Air Force is retiring 14 ‘A’ models in FY05.  No decision has 
been reached about whether the remaining C-5s will be upgraded or 
retired and replaced with C-17s. 
 
The two LARA researchers conducting this study joined forces with 
another three researchers from LAI who were focused on lean efforts 
at various programs as well as a more comprehensive base-wide view.  
We made two 2-3 days trips in January and February 2004. During 
these visits, we took guided tours of the facility, attended briefings on 
the scope of operations and lean initiatives at the base, and conducted 
group and individual interviews with 26 people.  In the C-5 program, 
this included four members of the lean change management team at 
various levels, as well as five mechanics and the union steward for the 
program. In order to understand the context of lean transformation for 
the workforce at Warner Robins, we also interviewed base-level 
                                                 
2 Instability as defined by the Labor Aerospace Research Agenda (LARA) is 
substantive change in organizational structure, economic factors, technological 
elements, and supply chain elements. 
2 
managers responsible for training, personnel, and labor relations, and 
had two group meetings at the union hall: one with union leaders and 
the other with stewards acting as lean points-of-contact. In some cases, 
follow-up interviews took place over the phone. We also relied on 
documentation provided by management and the union, as well as 
newspaper articles from the Robins Rev Up and the local press in 
Macon and San Antonio.       
 
Lean Change at the C-5 
 
Lean efforts began in June 2001 for the C-5 maintenance program. The 
program had had a rough start at Warner Robins and production 
lagged behind schedule. Most aircraft, 12 out of a total of 17, were 
delivered late in FY01; the average delay was 80 days.  Flow days per 
aircraft were 340, far from the 180 days set in the contract.  Depot 
leadership decided that implementing a lean work system was 
important to the improvement of base performance.  Lean theories 
derive out of the Toyota production system that is designed to respond 
to a customer pull, eliminate waste in all areas such as inventory or 
flow, integrate the supply chain, and rely on employee participation to 
drive continuous improvement.  Establishment of this system depends 
on factors such as clear goal setting, the development of trust, and 
stable relationships across the supply chain.  Many of these factors are 
in the lean plan at Warner Robins and base leadership is supporting the 
lean initiative.   
 
The first lean event involved drawing a top-level value stream map of 
the entire C-5 Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) process, from 
start to end. The map covered three walls, featuring more than 52 
major processes. Event participants also drew an ideal state map and 
an action plan of how to get there. The ideal state map pictured a 
streamlined process with eight work cells, visual production controls 
and a parts pull system that would bring flow time down to the target 
180 days. This map and the action plan provided a blueprint for lean 
efforts at the C-5 over the next two years. 
 
Implementation began with the back shops. These were smaller, self-
contained units where success could be shown early on. The first lean 
events took place in the Engine Pylon Shop (Aug 2001), the Landing 
Gear and Tire Shop (Sept 2001) and the Production Support Center  
(Oct 2001). Flow time dropped from 23 to 14 days in the pylon shop 
and from 14 to 11 days in the landing gear and tire shop, and the 
staffing level of the landing gear shop was now reduced. The workers 
were transferred to other parts of the C-5 program. 
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Next, lean started in evaluation and inspection (Nov 2001), which was 
not a back shop but a core maintenance task. Here the C-5 leadership’s 
reluctance to shift from the traditional system of assigning a crew to 
work on an aircraft from head to tail, to having the aircraft move 
through a series of specialized work cells had to be overcome. This 
reluctance was not unreasonable in that depot maintenance differs in 
some key ways from the high-volume manufacturing operations in 
which lean practices originated. Depot maintenance involves small-
batch production and high variation in the actual work package 
performed on each aircraft, which depends on “wear and tear.”  
Furthermore, some problems (e.g., corrosion), only become apparent 
once the aircraft has been taken apart. This variability makes harder to 
keep a smooth flow across work cells.  
 
The decision was finally made and the first cell, the “pre-dock cell” 
was created (Jan 2002) (See cell flow chart below). The cell consists 
of a dedicated team of mechanics and support staff that is responsible 
for de-fueling, de-arming, stripping and inspecting the aircraft, which 
is also taken to the paint shop for de-painting. About half the team are 
inspectors that conduct a thorough examination of the aircraft and 
input all identified problems into a database. This database is then used 
to generate work cards for the next cell, “dock cell.” The “pre-dock 
cell” is located in an uncovered area of the flight line; a building was 
added to store equipment and shelter workers from inclement weather. 
The team quickly bonded, organizing cookouts and other events. They 
reduced flow days from 37 to 22, bettering the 24 they had set as their 
target. (See cell flow chart below) 
 
Lean then moved on to the dock area (Feb 2002), where the bulk of the 
repair and maintenance work is performed. For almost a year, events 
were held to plan and prepare for the transition to the “dock cell” (Feb 
2003). The cell is located in the C-5’s only hangar dedicated to aircraft 
repair and includes four workstations. Each station has a dedicated 
team of mechanics and support staff. The cell holds four aircraft at a 
time for 60 days each. Any unfinished tasks become “traveled work” 
that needs to be performed outside. Initially, there was a separate team 
assigned to complete this work that was later eliminated as the need 
diminished. In late 2002, lean events also began to take place in the 
“post-dock cells”: rigging, fuel, paint, and functional tests, in that 
order. 
 
In the C-5, lean was thus introduced sequentially, from start to end of 
the production process. In each cell, this involved value-stream 
mapping, cleaning, sorting and rearranging the work area, 
standardizing work, making parts kits and having them, together with 
tools and supplies, ready at the point of use, as well as using 
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production control boards and other visual displays. The philosophy 
was to make the mechanic “the center of the universe:” mobilizing the 
workers’ knowledge and ideas about how to make their daily work 
more efficient and acting on their proposals. This, however, is easier 
said than done. It was found, for instance, that the training initially 
provided for lean event participants was not sufficient; it was 
expanded and a basic introduction to lean was also given to the whole 
C-5 workforce. Improving communication with workers and with 
middle-level managers that need to follow up with changes has 
remained a key goal for the lean team. 
 
C-5 Cell Flow Diagram* 
 
 
*Adapted from C-5 program materials 
 
A second-round value-stream mapping of the entire C5 PDM process 
took place in April 2003 to identify further improvement opportunities. 
By that time, nearly all the actions outlined in the first round had been 
completed and all cells were in place. Since then, lean has reached out 
to the support office. The first supply support event dealt with parts 
issues (March 2004). It identified flight controls as the number one 
item in need of improvement. More recently, the cell support teams 
(e.g., schedulers, planners, parts procurers) have moved physically to 
the cell area and are now in the process of standardizing their work.  
 
Adoption of lean is finding more resistance in the administrative 
environment. The planners, for instance, have resisted standardization, 
and quality control workers have resisted becoming part of the cell 
support team on the shop floor. The quality control workers have very 
2. Dock 
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  gear 
- remove other parts  
- clean/inspect 
- install pylons and    
   landing gear 
3. Rig/Fuel 
- install engine 
- check for leaks 
- install and  
  check other  
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4. Paint 
- sand and scuff 
- paint 
- weight and balance
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    Test 
- perform tests 
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Incoming 
aircraft 
1. Pre Dock 
- de-arm 
- de-fuel 
- remove parts 
- clean/inspect 
Outgoing 
aircraft 
- deliver 
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specialized skills, and integration into cells would likely require them 
to become more multi-skilled and change their function to quality 
assurance.  
 
Another task ahead is developing pull systems with suppliers.  Back in 
April 2002, a lean event on floorboards, which are produced internally 
at Warner Robins by the Commodities and Industrial Products 
Division, established such a system.  Creating pull systems with 
external suppliers might involve other ALCs as well. For example, the 
landing gear, which is a major constraint, is repaired at Ogden ALC.  
 
In all, there have been 54 lean events (three-five days) and half as 
many short (one day) events in the C-5 program as of March 2004. 
There has also been an effort to build in-house expertise, rather than 
rely exclusively on consultants. The lean team consisted of one person 
in June 2001 and grew to five by the end of 2001. It then reached nine 
in July 2003 and 10 in March 2004 (four of them trainees). 
 
Key results and Goals Ahead 
 
The C-5 
program 
has made 
substantial 
gains in 
productivity 
and 
schedule. 
The C-5 program has made substantial gains in productivity and 
schedule. Flow days, i.e., the time it takes, on average, to complete 
depot maintenance and repair on an aircraft have 
steadily declined from 340 days in FY01 to 229 days 
as of May 2004. This is so even after customer 
demand surged with the war and 23 aircraft had to be 
handled in FY03—a 35% increase over previous 
years. Demand for this year is 18 aircraft. 
 
The goal of 100% on-time delivery was reached in 
FY04, a vast improvement over FY01, when it was 
less than 30%. All 13 aircraft processed thus far in 
FY04 have been delivered ahead of schedule.  
 
Output per man/day has also increased by nearly 35% over the last two 
years. This metric is calculated by dividing direct produced standard 
hours by total paid hours (including indirect and military labor) and 
multiplying the result by eight, in order to turn hours into days. The 
number of direct labor personnel has remained fairly stable over this 
period. It went from 563 in Sept 2001 to 520 in Sept 2002, then up to 
550 in Sept 2003 and back to 520 in June 2004. This means that the 
gains we see at the C-5 are not simply the result of employing more 
mechanics to do the job.    
 
There are other signs of increased efficiency. The number of times the 
aircraft is towed, for instance, has halved: from 22 in FY01 to 11 in 
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FY04. “Traveled work,” which is work not completed during the time 
the aircraft is at the dock that has to be done later, outside the hangar, 
has also decreased. As of March, traveled work for FY04 was 1,984 
hours, 60% less than in FY01.       
 
Table 1 
C-5 PDM (Programmed Depot Maintenance) Results 
 
 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04* 
Flow days  (per aircraft) 340 280 268 229
Deliveries 
   Early 
   On-time 
   Late 
17 
2 
3 
12
17
2
4
11
23 
9 
2 
12 
12
12
0
0
Output per man/day  -- 2.70 3.25 3.64
 
* The fiscal year starts in October of the previous year and ends in 
September. Data for FY04 is up to the end of May. 
 
The C-5 program used the capacity freed up by lean improvements to 
attract additional workload. Unscheduled Depot Level Maintenance 
(UDLM) has been performed on 13 aircraft so far in FY04. In half of 
these cases, the work entailed replacing damaged torque decks, 
something that was previously contracted out.  The rest involved 
modifications or repair of combat-damaged aircraft. Together with 
lean, the new work is part of a drive to gain more control over the 
future; a future that looks now more secure since the Air Force has 
decided to turn C-5 maintenance into an in-house program.  
 
Lean efforts will continue. The goal is to further reduce flow time to 
180 days, to maintain 100% on-time delivery, and to continue 
improving quality. Large gains are likely to be made by leaning the 
parts supply process, but this is a complex task that involves more than 
reducing inventory but also, organizational practices, rules, and 
regulations that span beyond the C-5 and Warner Robins. 
 
The View from the Workforce 
 
The C-5 mechanics we interviewed said that lean had made their jobs 
easier, because everything they need, i.e., tools, supplies, and parts, is 
now “at their fingertips.” Several reported that they had become more 
efficient, mentioning standard work and daily briefings as some of the 
ways in which efficiency had been gained. One worker said: “We are 
more and more efficient this year because we have learned a lot in my 
shop.” Another stated: “I see a lot of good things happening here; we 
have made these changes and have made us more efficient -- people, 
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for the most part, show more pride.”  Lean has improved the work 
environment by promoting clean hangars, better facilities and the 
appropriate tools/equipment. A union steward summarized the 
workers’ sentiment as follows: “A lot of them like it, some 
don’t…People feel things have changed for the better.” 
 
When asked about the challenges they still face, mechanics pointed to 
the parts procurement process as a big issue in need of improvement. 
Several also asserted that supervisors and other managers needed to do 
more follow up after lean events. “There is no action a lot of times; 
things don’t always get implemented.” “You can have all the people 
you want buying into it, but then shovel it into the corner.” These 
mechanics also wanted to have more input throughout the process. 
One worker said: “I had my lean event 2 1/2 years ago…I haven’t had 
any activity to take stock, see if it needs any adjustment.” Another 
stated: “They come to us, we tell them how to fix it… but then they 
stop; they do not come back to us for further improvement.”   
 
Union officials echoed some of these themes. They identified, for 
instance, middle-managers as a weak link in a complex management 
structure that includes military and civilian counterparts. The union 
president remarked: “The only reason lean is working is because 
management is allowing workers to buy in and the union to be 
involved.”  The process has not yet been expanded to shifts in 
managerial roles at mid-levels.  Just as shopfloor workers find their 
roles changed, further implementation of lean will need to include 
changes at all levels. 
 
The union has secured participation in lean: the local vice-president 
works in the lean office and each program has a designated steward 
that acts as point-of-contact (POC). The POCs attend lean events and 
troubleshoot any concerns the union may have over the impact of 
proposed changes on work conditions. We found, however, that POC 
level of involvement varied greatly across the base. Some had 
participated in many events, while others had hardly any involvement; 
some saw themselves as a watchdog, while others had made many 
suggestions for improvements. Both union and management agreed 
that more training was needed for POCs and some momentum seemed 
to be building for it. At our meeting at the union hall, the POCs were 
excited by the chance to compare notes and asked for regular meetings 
to coordinate their efforts. 
 
The issues that have come up with lean include changes to job 
descriptions or work hours. An important issue is that the cell-based 
work system is leading some mechanics to lose certification as the 
range of work they perform has narrowed. This is less of a problem in 
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the C-5 than in the F-15 and C-130, where cells are more specialized. 
Certification is time rather than capability-based. Every year, workers 
need to perform required duties for a certain amount of time in order to 
qualify. If they lose certification, their employability on other 
programs or outside Warner Robins will be jeopardized. Workers try 
to get around this by working overtime in other cells, but managers are 
preventing people from doing so. This has led to a number of 
grievances. Plans to devise a rotation scheme have not yet been put 
into effect. Maintenance of individual skills and certification and its 
long-term implications are issues that require attention.  
 
Uncertainty 
must be 
tempered by 
trust and the 
belief that 
contributions 
to the base’s 
success will 
be rewarded 
fairly and 
equitably. 
Lean has also brought about worker concerns over promotions. 
Managers initially assigned the individuals they thought would 
perform best to work as lean change agents. These assignments were 
temporary and did not follow the normal competitive promotion 
process. Some workers saw them as favoritism. When 
the situation was corrected and the new positions 
posted, many of those originally assigned did not get 
the job. One of the reasons for this is that the promotion 
process handicaps mechanics due to their classification 
as wage grade rather than general staff. Management is 
trying to lessen this handicap, but the whole episode 
raised doubts over the fairness of the process in 
workers’ minds. The new DoD’s “modern personnel 
data system” has further confounded the issue.  The 
system was procured from a private contractor and 
reportedly has many bugs that must still be worked out. 
Until recently, Warner Robins had an automatic skills 
locator that identified candidates for promotion 
consideration. Now, the new system relies on self-
nomination, which places the burden on the employee 
to keep track of new openings and apply on line. Union officials and 
personnel staff are concerned that this might tend to keep more 
mechanics from being promoted.
 
The base commander promised at the onset of lean that it would not 
result in any lay offs. This proclamation was important because it 
diminished the workforce’s fear that their jobs could be eliminated as 
efficiency increased. When asked about the future, one of the 
mechanics we interviewed replied: “I hope we’ll get more work here; 
we have done well, 23 aircraft last year.” Others had BRAC on their 
minds, like the worker who mused: “From the record last year, we feel 
pretty secure; but then, the same was true in San Antonio.”  Base 
closings and other external forces are making workers feel insecure 
about the future. This can, in turn, lead them to hold back knowledge 
and ideas in a protective impulse that hinders lean efforts.    With this 
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in mind, labor and management are working to build a stronger 
relationship. 
 
The Wider Labor Relations Context 
 
Consensus is growing at Warner Robins on the improvement in the 
labor relations climate. Table 2 below illustrates the fluctuations in 
numbers of different types of disputes for a ten-year period. While the 
past has been somewhat contentious and dispute numbers were high, 
recent efforts such as an alternative dispute resolution plan, are having 
a positive effect.  General Wetekam used his 2002 State of the Center 
Report to highlight a serious problem with labor and human relations 
and then, in 2003, he used the same platform to report on the 
improvements accomplished on this front.  Labor and employee 
relations are important components to the environment at Warner 
Robins because they aid in the implementation of the new work 
system initiatives such as lean.   
 
Labor relations had deteriorated over time and union leadership felt 
that the only avenue through which communication could be 
channeled were the various dispute resolution processes available.  
The result was a dramatic increase in disputes in 1999, 2000, and 
2002.  According to labor relations staff, the main grievance disputes 
arose over performance appraisals, improperly scheduled overtime, 
and work classification issues.  There was no direct reference of any 
impact from lean on these disputes.  Complaints were filed over the 
permanent award of jobs that had been temporarily filled at the 
introduction of lean efforts.  
 
In 2003, union and management signed three agreements to attempt to 
improve the employment relations climate.  The first is a partnership 
agreement that fosters better relations between the union and 
leadership at the base.  The agreements also mandate mediation efforts 
at an early stage and  pursuing a fast track for unfair labor practice 
charges internally with the intent to resolve them before they go to an 
external agency. The parties thought that improving relations and 
reducing dispute levels would increase overall ALC effectiveness. 
General Wetekam said, “I am pleased with this agreement.  It’s good 
for the workers at Robins, it’s good for the Air Force and it’s good for 
the community.”3  Local Congressman Jim Marshall, whose 
involvement in the effort indicates the importance of the base for the 
local economy, said “Increasing the ability to communicate at the base 
level and resolve these matters before they reach Air Force level is 
                                                 
3 Lanorris Askew, Labor agreement called a step forward,  Rev-Up, May 23, 2003, 
2A 
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very helpful to the base in accomplishment of its mission and to this 
community.”4  
  
Table 2: Dispute Types and Numbers at Warner Robins ALC    1993 – 2003 
Type of 
Complaint 
 
199
3 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
Labor 
Grievances 
194 210 212 306 250 139 399 1044 211 506 223 
Unfair 
Labor 
Practices 
42 34 85 101 72 117 136 57 9 111 57 
349 362 257 329 370 345 426 445 441 318 292 Informal 
and Formal 
EEO 
Complaints 
21 27 32 27 52 31 73 80 80 104 62 
            
Totals 606 633 586 763 744 632 1034 1626 741 1039 634 
 
Current efforts to reduce dispute levels appear to be successful.  The 
number of grievances fell almost 60% from 506 in 2002 to 223 in 
2003.  Mediation is now credited in resolution of more than 2/3 of the 
grievances filed.  Unfair labor practice allegations were also cut in half 
from 111 to 57.  Nearly all of these allegations are now solved 
internally.  After the establishment of a diversity council and a 
supervisory training program, Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) 
complaints are also down 40%, from 104 to 62.  Given past 
oscillations in the number of disputes, it will be important to see 
whether this downward trend continues in the next years.   
 
Collective bargaining is largely done at the national level between Air 
Force Materiel Command and the American Federation of 
Government Employees (AFGE) Council 214.  The council represents 
10 union locals around the country with a bargaining unit of 
approximately 36,000 workers in both blue and white-collar 
occupations.5  Council 214 leadership helped develop and endorsed the 
alternative dispute resolution plans that have been introduced at 
Warner Robins as well as other bases. 
 
While Council 214 bargains the master labor agreement at the national 
level, locally there has been little formal contract negotiation activity 
for many years.  The local agreement language, which covers issues of 
specific local application such as shift times, appears unchanged since 
1982.  Labor and management have been very cautious about opening 
                                                 
4 Ibid 
5 Federal workers have the right to be represented by their unions without becoming 
members.   
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negotiations, although recently, tentative preliminary discussions were 
reported.  Evolving avenues for communication and increased 
acknowledgement of shared interests will improve labor-management 
relations, but tensions and factors external to the base will also insure 
that this is a delicate process.  Changes already underway will increase 
the challenges facing union and management leadership. 
 
Instability from the Larger Perspective 
 
Even as their efforts support warfighters in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
other global hotspots, workers at Warner Robins worry about how 
forces beyond their control will affect their work lives and paychecks.  
Local leaders have introduced innovative work practices, dispute 
resolution and cost-cutting measures to enhance the stability and future 
of the base.  But there is also BRAC, the new employment relations 
laws handed down by Congress, and privatization, all of which are less 
controllable, external threats to stability.  Examination of these factors 
will shed light on the pressures that base leaders face as they work to 
improve performance.   
 
The impetus to assess and close unnecessary military bases first arose 
in the sixties as the military shifted from WWII readiness to Cold War 
readiness.  Closures are endorsed as cost-saving measures for U.S. 
taxpayers.  The next round of BRAC-mandated closures will be 
announced in 2005.  These closures affect more than just the workers 
at the base.  If Warner Robins Air Logistics Center is closed in the 
next round of BRAC, the state of Georgia will lose its largest 
industrial employer.  Data for 2003 credits the base with a $4.1 billion 
impact on Georgia’s economy.6  With stakes this high, each related 
action takes on great importance.  Local, state, and federal government 
officials work with private citizen groups to influence the decision-
making.  Every aspect of the process is scrutinized and every statistic 
of base operations analyzed to see if any detail that could make a 
difference has been overlooked.  For example, grievance levels or 
costs such as worker compensation payments can take on deeper 
significance because they might reflect poorly on base performance.   
 
Beyond BRAC, civil service workers are now learning the 
ramifications of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) that 
was created as part of the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act.7  
DoD officials now have greater authority to develop and implement 
new rules for human resources, labor-management relations, and 
employee appeals systems.  Warner Robins chief personnel officer, 
                                                 
6 “Economic Impact Statement 2003”, Warner Robins ALC Public Affairs Office .  
7 The website for the National Security Personnel System is 
http://www.cpms.osd.mil/nsps/ 
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Michael O’Hara, has said that the impact of this law will be 
fundamental “and will be the largest change I’ve been involved in 
during the 31 years or so that I’ve worked for the government.”8  
According to the DoD NSPS website; 
 
“NSPS will create a new framework of rules, regulations, and 
processes —rooted in the principles of flexibility and fairness 
— that govern the way civilians are hired, compensated, 
promoted, and disciplined in DoD. This law was necessary to 
replace outdated and rigid civil service rules that hindered the 
Department's ability to carry out its national security mission, 
and to recognize the critical role that the hardworking, 
dedicated DoD civilian workforce plays in that mission.” 
 
DoD officials are currently meeting at a national level with union 
leaders and others to plan a transition to the new regulations. AFGE 
union officials have warily watched the actions of the Bush 
Administration since 2003 when, what they dubbed “the Rumsfeld 
Plan,” was unveiled.  The plan exempted selected federal workers 
from the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.9  At the time 
of our visit, local leaders were not certain of what the full impact of 
these legal changes would be.  The full spectrum of employment 
relations will be reviewed and reconstituted with the stated goal of 
making the DoD “a more competitive and progressive employer at a 
time when the country's national security demands a highly responsive 
system of civilian personnel management.”  DoD now has the “latitude 
to assign occupations and positions to broad occupational groups and 
broad pay levels and to establish qualifications for positions.”10  The 
unions fear that these new regulations will erode collective bargaining 
rights and reduce worker protections.  This could, in turn, affect their 
support for cooperative endeavors such as lean that are taking place in 
different ALCs.    
 
Incentives and trust are essential components of any positive 
workplace change like lean.  Therefore new employment regulations 
will play a critical role.  For example, wages will be among the areas 
affected by the law.  Pay bands will be established that group current 
compensation grades together.  The bands have open pay ranges, with 
                                                 
8  Holly J. Logan, “Pay, grade changes on the way for civilians”, Robins Rev-Up, 
V49, 9 March 5, 2004, 1A. 
9 NCFLL Courier, Volume 19 Issue 1, 1  Quarter 2004, p 6.  reports that the “Rumsfeld 
personnel Plan”  transferred 170,000 federal workers to the Department of Homeland Security 
and took away their rights to representation.  As a result of this reduction in the federal 
workforce, federal appeals agencies are reducing their staffing levels and closing offices.  The 
Merit System Protection Board, the Federal Labor Relations Authority and the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission have all cut back on their coverage.
st
10 From the NSPS website cited above.  
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no fixed step rates.  The DoD has run several demonstration projects 
and in each case “a key factor was the elimination of the many limiting 
grades and steps within the current general schedule system.  NSPS 
will eliminate the grades and steps pay architecture and will simplify 
job classification.” Care must be taken to ensure that the 
implementation of these changes is perceived by workers as 
procedurally just and equitable, in order to preserve morale. 
 
Contracting out is a widespread practice in every aspect of government 
work.  Such privatization of government services is a goal that the 
U.S. government is seriously and deliberately pursuing.  Cutting costs 
and improving services through competition are two of the most 
frequent arguments heard in the privatization debate. Others, however, 
counter that federal employees often perform the services more 
effectively due to their expertise and a lack of appropriate oversight 
mechanisms for the private contractors who take over the work.  In 
any event, privatization affects lean efforts because it makes federal 
employees feel insecure in their jobs, undermining the trust and 
commitment necessary for continuous improvement processes. In 
interviews, several people reported uneasiness with the contractors’ 
practice of hiring retirees at Warner Robins. They complained that a 
person could retire and come back the next day to the same job but 
working for a private company.   
The C5 program provides other examples of how privatization can 
play out.  When Kelly Air Force Base was closed in 2001 as a result of 
the last round of BRAC, redevelopment efforts attracted private 
companies like Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney to the 
vacated military installation. Many of these companies are aerospace 
parts or service providers and can tap into the local pool of skills 
among former Kelly employees. One company is indeed repairing C-5 
engines at San Antonio. So while some jobs have been regained and 
competition appears to have increased as a result of community 
redevelopment, this case raises concerns about long-term skills 
provision.  As both government and private sector try to reduce costs, 
new training initiatives look less attractive than alternatives such as 
offshoring or hiring laid-off and retired workers with pre-existing 
skills.  Over time, these avenues do not replenish the skills base and it 
is not clear who is training the U.S. aerospace workforce of the future.     
Conclusions 
 
The C-5 program has succeeded in their initial lean efforts.  As 
workforce understanding of lean principles grows, performance can 
continue to improve.  Lean depends on a deep and ongoing integration 
of the process principles with the knowledge of the workers to create 
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continuous incremental improvements.  Lean implementation 
frequently begins as a series of one-time events rather than an ongoing 
engagement of workforce knowledge and creativity.  This has been the 
pattern at Warner Robins as well.   
 
As management evaluates the outcomes of these activities, they are 
beginning to recognize that they were paying more attention to the 
number of lean events than to the amount of continuous improvement 
produced. This initial focus on rapid deployment also meant reliance 
on external consultants, rather than developing endogenous capacity 
for lean. More recently, base management is taking a more strategic 
approach that pays greater attention to sustainment.  Further progress 
will be constrained by three factors: organizational complexity, lack of 
decision-making autonomy, and the impact of instability. 
 
Organizational Complexity: Successful lean operations are 
generally characterized by flatter structures where organizational 
layers have been reduced and more authority decentralized to front-
line workers.  We did not find this process underway at Warner 
Robins.  There appear to be increasing layers of middle management 
within the organization while workers have not yet begun to take on 
significant autonomy.  In addition, the dual military and civilian 
leadership structures are complex hierarchies that add layers of 
relationships and chains of command to operations at Warner Robins.  
These structures may pose a serious constraint on lean improvements 
because they reduce flexibility and information sharing.   
 
Lack of Decision-Making Autonomy:  Warner Robins ALC is 
embedded in a web of regulation and regulatory structure. This web 
often takes the decision-making authority out of the hands of the base 
leadership and limits the scope of lean changes that can be pursued 
locally, without involvement of higher-level structures such as the Air 
Force Materiel Command (AFMC). This constraint is becoming more 
apparent as lean efforts move up from the maintenance floor to the 
support administrative areas.  For example, those involved in leaning 
the purchase request process at Warner Robins found their options 
limited by decisions made outside the base.11   
 
Impact of Wider Instability:  For workers at Warner Robins, the 
link between their performance and employment security is blurred by 
wider forces, such as BRAC and privatization.  In both these 
situations, the livelihood of the worker is at risk and seems to be 
subject to political decisions. The new NSPS adds to this uncertainty, 
as it may result in reduced rights and protections.  Job security is a key 
                                                 
11 Jessica Cohen, 2004, WR-ALC – Lean and the PR Process, p 12-13.
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aspect of the employment bargain when lean is introduced.12  Without 
a sense of security, workers are less likely to freely share the 
knowledge and creativity necessary for continuous improvement.  In 
this context, the current efforts at building a stronger partnership with 
the union at Warner Robins are important because they might help 
alleviate the fears of the workforce.  Developing trust and a mutual 
sense of responsibility for one another is a difficult but essential 
element of success. 
 
 
Teaching Notes 
 
It is people who are at the heart of new work systems – establishing 
stability and then driving continuous improvement.  The Labor 
Aerospace Research Agenda (LARA) at MIT is committed to furthering 
our understanding of the human and institutional aspects of these new 
work systems, especially as they relate to broader issues of 
employment and vitality in the aerospace industry. Toward this end, 
LARA has produced a series of Case Studies.  These Case Studies were 
written by an MIT-based research team and were developed in 
conjunction with representatives from each of the sites. 
 
These case studies are designed for use by union leaders, managers, 
trainers, college and university educators, and others interested in 
fostering constructive dialogue about the current dilemmas, challenges 
and innovations in employment matters in the aerospace industry.  
These cases can be used in a classroom setting, in small discussion 
groups, or by individuals as thought starters. 
 
This case study was prepared as an example of the challenges of 
instability in the aerospace industry.  It was written as a basis for 
dialogue and learning, not as an illustration of either effective or 
ineffective actions.  There may be many possible answers to these 
questions.  They are designed to foster constructive dialogue and 
action on these very challenging issues. 
 
Potential Discussion Questions 
 
• Describe the impact of instability on the workforce at 
Warner Robins. 
 
• What are your suggestions for overcoming the resistance to 
lean in the administrative environment at Warner Robins? 
                                                 
12 Cutcher-Gershenfeld and others, 1999, Knowledge-Driven Work, Oxford 
University Press. 
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• Discuss the pros and cons of privatization from the 
perspective of a taxpayer in the town of Warner Robins. 
 
• Management has set goals to continue the lean efficiency --  
for instance, to reduce flow time to 180 days and to 
maintain 100% on time delivery.  What do you consider 
essential for these goals to be met? 
 
• Identify the stakeholders in the success of lean at Warner 
Robins?  What concerns does each have and what role will 
each play in the ongoing efforts at the base? 
 
 
 
 
 
Betty Barrett, Ph.D. and Lydia Fraile, PhD. of Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology prepared this case in 2004.  This case study is an 
example of the challenges of instability in the aerospace industry and 
was written as a basis for dialogue and learning – not as an illustration 
of either effective or ineffective actions. 
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obtain a listing of LARA case studies, or to request permission to 
reproduce materials, please email laraproject@mit.edu, write to the 
Labor Aerospace Research Agenda, Center for Technology, Policy, 
and Industrial Development, MIT, One Amherst Street, Cambridge, 
MA  02139  or call (617) 258-7207. 
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